Supreme Court as a Legislature by Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 1 November 1978 Article 1
Supreme Court as a Legislature
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1978)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol64/iss1/1
CORNELL
LAW REVIEW
Volume 64 November 1978 Number 1
THE SUPREME COURT AS
A LEGISLATURE*
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. I
The Supreme Court is at least nominally a court but in some
respects is certainly a legislative body. That it is a court and
should act like one is the theme of many contemporary critical
analyses of its performance, particularly those by institutional con-
servatives.' That the Supreme Court makes policy, and should, is
the basic theme of many other observers, particularly institutional
innovationists.2 Along a somewhat distinct axis of differentiation,
the Supreme Court's character as a court is central to the thought
of most legal scholars, while its character as a policymaking body
is central to the approach of most political scientists and jour-
nalists. 3
In this essay I do not argue for a choice between these views.
Quite the contrary, I propose to accept both of them as true, be-
cause I think both are true. What I hope to show is that some
interesting and possibly constructive ideas suggest themselves
upon acceptance of the premise that the Court is a legislature.
* An earlier version of this Article was presented as the Robert S. Stevens Lecture at
Cornell Law School on April 3, 1978.
t Garver Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1953, Swarthmore College; LL.B.
1954, Columbia University.
1 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); P. KURLAND, POLITICS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); L. LusKY, By WHAT RIGHT? (1975).
2 See, e.g., A. BERLE, THE THREE FACES OF POWEI (1967); C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND
THE COURT (1960); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968).
3 See, e.g., W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OFJUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); C.H. PRITCHETT, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1968).
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By a "legislature," I mean a body whose chief function in
government is to formulate general rules of law that primarily
reflect the notions of utility and value held by its members. Such a
body is to be distinguished from a trial court, which applies law
received from legally superior sources; from an administrative
agency, which, in its rulemaking capacity, formulates policy only
within the limits of its organic statute; and from a "traditional"
appellate court, which, in formulating law, is guided primarily by
precedent. By "policy," I mean the specific social purposes that a
legislative body seeks to fulfill through its enactments. These def-
initions are not watertight, but they will suffice to indicate the
tendency of my argument.
THE LEGALITY OF THE SUPREME COURT
AS A LEGISLATURE
The Constitution abounds with indications that the Supreme
Court is indeed a court. 4  What may thus be called the plain
meaning of that document the Court has buttressed with its own
interpretation. 5 Finally, in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and in
subsequent pronouncements, Congress has reiterated that the
Supreme Court is just what its name suggests.' Indeed, so
' "[Slupreme Court" is the name originally given to it (U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1), one
that still attaches. Article III vests in the Court the "judicial Power of the United States"
(id.), in a document that in terms distinguishes that power from "legislative Powers" (id. art.
I, § 1). The power conferred on the Court refers to "Cases" and "Controversies" in "Law
and Equity" (id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1), terms that unequivocally suggest an adjudicative tri-
bunal in the mold of English antecedents and state counterparts. The term "Jurisdiction" is
used to describe the authority in question (id. cl. 2). The officials who exercise it are re-
ferred to as "Judges" and are given the security in office uniquely associated with the
judiciary-tenure during "good Behaviour" (id. § 1). Under all accepted canons for the
construction of legal documents, the inference is compelling that, in the intendment of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court is a court.
5 Some interpretations so closely followed upon the Constitution's adoption as to come
within the principle of contemporaneous construction. In these pronouncements, the Jus-
tices indicated that giving advisory opinions (see note 19 infra) and attending to administra-
tive responsibilities (see Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), discussed in note 19
infra) were both beyond the powers conferred on them. The results and the language of
these dispositions plainly indicate that the Supreme Court thought itself to be a court. And
it is perhaps worth noting that the Court has never departed from this interpretation,
notwithstanding its long history, the variousness in political views of those who have been
Justices, and the repeated assertions by others that the institution was behaving as some-
thing else.
' What is now known as the Judiciary Act of 1789 was entitled, with a redundancy
interpretable only as a device of emphasis, "An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The Act provided for the Supreme
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unequivocal are the legal authorities on this point that anyone
advancing a different view must rely almost entirely on inference.
Nevertheless, there is an evidentiary basis for inference.
It is a historical fact that the Constitutional Convention seri-
ously entertained proposals for a Council of Revision, a body em-
powered to review legislation and to veto or amend in appropriate
circumstances. 7  Had the proposed Council been directly modeled
on the precedent of the English Privy Council, its powers would
have included both that of reversing judgments in particular cases
and that of nullifying legislation on the ground of invalidity.8 In
one version suggested at the time of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the membership of the Council was to include Justices of the
Supreme Court, thus creating an ex officio connection between the
legislative and judicial functions. 9
The fact that these proposals were rejected is usually ad-
vanced as strong evidence that the Supreme Court was not in-
tended to be a Council of Revision or the repository of the powers
associated with such a tribunal. 10 Yet the action of the Constitu-
tional Convention in rejecting the proposal for a Council of Revi-
sion has to be appraised in full historical context and with regard
for the familiar political phenomenon that a proposal can be re-
jected eo nomine while being substantially adopted in content. In
this perspective, it is significant that one argument against the
proposed Council was that its function could be performed by the
judiciary in the course of adjudication. 1 In the end, the Conven-
tion did not adopt the proposal for a Council of Revision, but
neither did it explicitly confer on the judiciary the authority to
declare legislation invalid. The Convention's silence in the latter
Court, staffed it with a "chief justice" and five "associate justices" (id. § 1), and prescribed
for it a set of procedures. These procedures were drawn from common law and equity,
embodying such terms as 'judgment," "decree," and "writ." The functions of the Court
were to be performed by means of devices such as the writ of error (id. § 22) and the writs
of prohibition and mandamus (id. § 13), thus plainly implying that it was part of a court
system. Subsequent legislation concerning the Supreme Court reveals a similar interpreta-
tion, although it must be acknowledged that Congress has occasionally wavered in this
interpretation, as will be noticed in a moment. But for the most part in its legislative pro-
nouncements, Congress has accepted the view that the Supreme Court is a court.
7 For the most intensive discussion, see R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT
47-119 (1969). See J. GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 208-10 (P. Freund ed. 1971).
' See J.H. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS
523-653 (1950).
9 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 7, at 208.
10 See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 7, at 341-43.
"Id. at 50, 55, 57.
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respect is now taken as an implicit but unmistakable recognition
of the power of judicial review. 2 That is fair enough, at least
given subsequent history. But making that inference does not
foreclose the inference that the Convention, in implicitly affirm-
ing the legitimacy of judicial review, also implicitly affirmed the
version of judicial review that tended toward the function of a
Council of Revision. 1 3 After all, there was at the time no settled
view of the concept and proper scope of judicial review, 4 any
more than there has been since.
The action of the Convention regarding the Council of Revi-
sion and judicial review can thus be construed simply as a post-
ponement of the issue of the judiciary's function in lawmaking.
Any such overt role for the judiciary was then, as now, politically
controversial. An explicit provision on the subject would have
added to the burden of political initiative that the proponents of
the Constitution well knew was already formidable. In this light,
Hamilton's famous defense of judicial review in No. 78 of The
Federalist 15 can be viewed as seeking to insure that the Constitu-
tion's silence was not negatively construed and, more strongly, as
ascribing a broad meaning to a concept whose connotation had
been unresolved at the drafting stage. Both are familiar
techniques of legal argument in the interpretation of legislation.
The evidence that the Supreme Court was not intended to be
a legislative body thus consists of (a) legislative history, (b) only a
fragment of which is preserved, (c) concerning an intensely de-
bated issue, (d) on which compromise was possible by silence as
well as by expression, (e) dealing with a nebulous legal concept,
(f) in the face of almost total uncertainty in the political situation,
current and future. Drawing a conclusion from such cir-
cumstances is surely as much a matter of faith or projection as of
induction. It must at least be conceded that the legislative history
12 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 9 & n.34 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER].
,3 It is of course true that the debate in the Constitutional Convention sought to distin-
guish the power to veto legislation from the power to find legislation unconstitutional in an
adjudication. See R. BERGER, supra note 7, at 50-69. But then as now the distinction could
not be clearly drawn. Moreover, the political consideration supporting the two concepts is
the same-fear of pernicious laws. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, at 78 (1911) (remarks of George Mason).
14 See generally Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitu-
tional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972).
15 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521, 524-26 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
[Vol. 64:1
1978] THE SUPREME COURT AS A LEGISLATURE 5
of article III is compatible with the Supreme Court having powers
going well beyond those of a conventionally defined court.
Contemporaneous legal construction of the judicial power
conferred in the Constitution inclines in the same direction. On
this point, the Judiciary Act of 1789 is both a legislative enactment
and a gloss on the Constitution. Section 25 of that Act defined the
Supreme Court's powers of appellate review over state court deci-
sions "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute
of, or an authority exercised under the United States ... or ...
the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any
State." 16 The Judiciary Act thus simultaneously implied that the
state courts could pass upon the validity of federal legislation and
other federal action, that the Supreme Court could pass upon the
correctness of such state court decisions, and that the Supreme
Court could, at least as against state courts, authoritatively ex-
pound the meaning of the Constitution.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 also gave the Supreme Court
power of appellate review over the lower federal courts.1 7  Read-
ing this power along with that concerning review of state court
decisions leads compellingly to the inference that there was similar
authority to pass upon the validity of legislative enactments in liti-
gation arising in the federal courts. These powers are certainly
legislative in some sense. At the very least, section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, quoted above, empowered the Supreme
Court to act as a Council of Revision so far as concerns maintain-
ing the legal structure of federalism."'
It is also worth considering the implications of early requests
that the Supreme Court render advisory opinions and that the
lower federal courts perform administrative functions. The Jus-
tices declared both tasks to lie outside the judicial power. 19 But
" Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73.
27 Id. § 22.
"s The terms of the authority conferred by § 25 include only questions of "validity,"
which implies nothing more than a power to compare the text of the Constitution with the
text of the subordinate legal authority and to nullify the latter when it is discrepant with
the former. But a study of M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), for
example, suggests that the power involves a decisional process going beyond analysis of
texts.
9 While Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, considered a strict constructionist, pre-
sented to the Supreme Court a request for an advisory opinion (see Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay (July 18, 1793), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF
JOHN JAY 486 (H. Johnston ed. 1891)) based on questions submitted by President
Washington (see 10 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 542-45 (J. Sparks ed. 1836)). The
Court declined in a letter to the President. See Letter from Chief Justice Jay to President
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such invitations surely would not have been extended if there
were not good reason for thinking that the Court had authority to
accept them.
Nevertheless, no clear definition of the legal powers of the
Supreme Court had emerged before 1803. That, of course, was
the year when Marbury v. Madison 20 was decided. In Marbury, the
Court asserted the power to determine the constitutionality of an
act of Congress. According to Chief Justice Marshall, this power
derives from the judicial function of having to decide a case ac-
cording to law, the Constitution being supreme and displacing all
inconsistent law. Put differently, the Court concluded that the
power to review the constitutionality of a statute is simply an inci-
dent of the judicial function of arriving at judgment in a litigated
case. 2' That proposition is the foundation of the concept of the
Court as a court rather than a legislative body.
If Marshall's assertion is taken in context, however, it is not so
innocuous. For while the opinion in Marbury disclaimed any au-
thority beyond that supposedly necessary to judicial office, the
Court was also doing and saying other things. It held invalid a
statutory enactment of Congress-the most sovereign expression
of the legislative function. Beyond this, the Court, in measured
dicta, asserted its authority to adjudge the legality of actions taken
Washington (August 8, 1793), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OFJOHN JAY, supra,
488-89. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 64-70. Thus the Court's response
was itself advisory.
The significance of the Court's early position concerning administrative functions is a
little more remote but not de minimis. The question arose in connection with a federal
statute providing that the lower federal courts should examine and make recommendations
concerning the worthiness of applicants for veterans' pensions for service in the
Revolutionary War. The Supreme Court's decision-again advisory-was that judges
should not undertake this function because it involved subordination of the judges to the
administrative authority of the Executive. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.).409 (1792).
But in enacting the statute Congress obviously had thought that federal judges could exer-
cise administrative functions along with judicial ones. Cf. Hartog, The Public Law of a County
Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 282
(1976) ("sessions courts" exercising judicial and administrative powers at local level). Hence,
it is inferable that in the mind of Congress the judiciary was invested, or could be invested,
with mixed powers, judicial and administrative. If so, it is also inferable that the judiciary
could possess other mixtures of powers, perhaps judicial and legislative. Furthermore,
about this time John Jay was acting at once as Chief Justice and chief negotiator of the
treaty with Great Britain-the latter an executive responsibility entailing at least quasi-
legislative powers. Jay's role, however, was much criticized. See J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 7,
at 747.
20 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21 Id. at 177-80.
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by officials of the Executive. 22  With the assumption of these
powers, the Court could well say "[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the [judiciary] to say what the law is." 23 This dictum
made unambiguous the Court's claim to an authority that has sub-
sequently been conceded to it. That is the authority to pronounce
what the law "is" in a universal sense, not merely as a rule of
decision, and with definitiveness, not merely as an expositor coor-
dinate with the other two branches of government.24
The decision in Marbury v. Madison may not sustain the prop-
osition that the Supreme Court is a legislative body, but it cer-
tainly sustains the broadest claims of authority ever made by or on
behalf of the Supreme Court or any other court. Whatever that
authority might be called, it is what makes the Supreme Court a
unique legal institution. It is also the central subject of all sub-
sequent discussions of the Court's proper province. A rose by any
other name. 25
22 Id. at 162-73. The import of the latter assertion has to be considered in conjunction
with the authority to determine the constitutionality of legislation. If the legality of an
executive official's conduct can be reviewed by the Court, and if in determining its legality
the Court can disregard a statute, the effect on executive authority is "chilling." Cf. Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (school board member liable for damages for "bad
faith" violation of student's constitutional rights). After Marbury every public official-
hence everyone through whom government might attempt to act-faced the prospect of
personal liability if his conduct exceeded either the authority purportedly conferred by
statute or the authority which, in the opinion of the Court, a statute could validly confer
under the Constitution. Cf. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (captain of
American frigate liable for damages following detention of Dutch vessel pursuant to execu-
tive order to detain certain American vessels).
23 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
24 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). This is a formidable combination of
authority-to declare the law beyond what the Legislature has said it is and beyond what
the Executive thinks it is. Perhaps equally important, the case in which the power was
appropriated, Marbury v. Madison, was in fact a thinly disguised contrivance of litigation,
both in its initiation and in the necessity for making the pronouncements that were made.
The matter in Marbury went to judgment without definite factual premises (either by
factfinding or through demurrer) or adversarial argument, elements said to be the distinc-
tive features of the judicial process. Hence, it was neither a case, because there were no
definite facts, nor a controversy, because there was no bilateral disputation by interested
parties. The position that constitutional judicial review is only a product of adjudication is
thus compromised by the circumstance that the case establishing that form of lawmaking
lacked the rudiments of adjudication. If the requirement of a justiciable controversy is
what differentiates the adjudicative from the legislative, it has to be recognized that Mar-
bury v. Madison reduced that requirement to a formality.
25 Congress has from time to time explicitly recognized the legislative character of the
Supreme Court, sometimes forgetfully. Such, for example, was the situation in Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). There an act of Congress prescribed a suit to obtain a
determination of the validity of legislation governing the property rights of a certain group
of Indians. Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015. The Act was held to be an
unconstitutional attempt to elicit an advisory opinion from the courts. Muskrat v. United
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1
The argument that legally the Court is not a legislative body
is thus at least legally debatable. Perhaps even those who would
most narrowly define the Court would concede that their position
is not textually demonstrable. Yet this is not the end of the mat-
ter. The proposition that the Court is not a legislative body is
usually sustained-like all answers to important legal
questions-by political arguments. The essence of these argu-
ments is that the Court "is" not a legislative body because undesir-
able practical consequences would follow if it were.
II
THE POLITICAL LEGITIMACY OF THE SUPREME
COURT AS A LEGISLATURE
The argument most commonly advanced against the Court's
being a legislature begins with the fact that the court is not demo-
cratically elected.2 6 From this indisputable point the inference is
drawn, often as though it necessarily followed, that it is un-
States, 219 U.S. at 361-62. (One interpretation of the holding is that the Act constituted an
improper interference with the Court's authority to determine when and in what terms it
would exercise its legislative reviewing function.) At any rate, the sky did not fall, or even
slightly darken. The test case was simply recast in conventional form-that is, essentially
like Marbury v. Madison, as a suit against a government official in contemplation that the
validity of the legislation would be drawn into issue by the official's defense to the suit. The
desired determination by the Supreme Court was duly obtained. See Gritts v. Fisher, 224
U.S. 640 (1912).
More recently, various expediting provisions have been enacted by Congress and sus-
tained by the Court as vehicles for obtaining prompt determination of the constitutionality
of important legislation. For example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976), upheld
such a provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437(h) (1976). The
Court did find, however, that plaintiffs had a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to
fall within the article III limits. Id. Cf. Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp. (Regional
Rail Reorganization Act Cases), 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (expedited review of Special Court
determination of constitutionally fair and equitable compensation to rail lines under Re-
gional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 45 U.S.C. § 743(c) (Supp. V 1975)). Northern
Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976), oddly, is like Muskrat in that it
involved a suit prescribed in a special statute (Act of July 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-424, § 2,
82 Stat. 424) to determine the property rights of a group of Indians. Note may also be
taken of the plethora of recent legislation combining broad if often vacuous delegation of
rulemaking powers to an administrative agency with generous opportunity for compendi-
ous judicial review. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973); Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-
Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air
Act, 62 IOWA L. REv. 713 (1977). The resulting judicial proceedings may not be purely
legislative, but neither do they bear much more than formal resemblance to proceedings by
writ of error.
"f See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16. But see Rostow, The Democratic Character of
Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1952).
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desirable to promulgate legislation-legislation of any kind-in a
nondemocratic forum. But this conclusion is neither self-evident,
logically inevitable, nor an accurate summary of our legislative
institutions. We need not dwell on the questi6n whether legis-
latures are "democratic" in any sense of the word-that is,
whether legislators are essentially similar to the citizenry in
background, outlook, predispositions, and value preferences;
whether citizens have equal effect in selecting the legislature;
whether legislatures give equal weight to the interests of all citi-
zens; et cetera.2 7 It is sufficient to note that most legislation
emanating from legislatures in modern times is chiefly the prod-
uct of committees and experts, and sometimes committees of ex-
perts. 28 The same is true of administrative agencies, which pro-
duce the bulk of contemporary legislation. Of course, it can be
said that through various mechanisms internal to legislatures and
external to administrative agencies, the "general will" is somehow
made to infuse statutes and administrative regulations so that they
are withal the product of a democratic process. But even if that is
so, it has to be demonstrated why, by some comparable
mechanism, the "general will" does not also infuse decisional law-
making in courts. On the other hand, if, as many critics complain,
neither Congress nor the agencies adequately express public sen-
timent, it is hard to see why the Supreme Court should be subject
to special criticism because it also does not express that sentiment.
More fundamentally, to say that the Supreme Court is undem-
ocratic in its composition and procedure is to beg the essential
question: What kinds of lawmaking institutions will best promote
the substantive goals summed up by the shorthand "democracy"?
For it is substantive goals-like moral equality, private autonomy,
and general economic well-being-that define "democratic" when
that term describes a community rather than a particular political
institution.29
The failure to distinguish between democratic means and
democratic ends leads pointlessly round and round: A country is
democratic that has democratic institutions. Our country is demo-
cratic; therefore the exercise of legislative powers by the Supreme
27 Well-selected references on these and related questions appear in D. MAYHEW, CON-
GRESs: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1975), and Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political
Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810 (1974).
28 See R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN CoMMITTEES (1973).
29 See Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
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Court must be democratic. 30 As a matter of rhetoric this achieves
the desired compatibility between judicial lawmaking and demo-
cratic credo. But it does so by expanding "democratic process"
beyond the point where that concept has any meaning at all. Such
dissipation of meaning seems to inhere in all arguments along this
line, but perhaps nowhere more transparently than in Dean Ros-
tow's attempt to harmonize judicial review and procedural democ-
racy: "The task of democracy is not to have the people vote di-
rectly on every issue, but to assure their ultimate responsibility for
the acts of their representatives, elected or appointed." 31 Such a
formulation, I submit, would permit every form of regency or
oligarchy to be called democratic as long as the ruler could argue
that the ultimate (with no regard to the proximate) responsibility for
his acts resided in the people. What government does not so pre-
tend?
If such approaches are abandoned and the assumption made
that there could be a (substantively) democratic country governed
by a (procedurally) undemocratic set of institutions, fundamental
concepts of democracy can be preserved. It is not obvious that the
only path to the goals of a democratic polity is a wholly demo-
cratic legislative process -meaning one that approximately expresses
majoritarian sentiment at any given time. By way of comparison,
we employ quite "undemocratic" institutions to conduct adjudica-
tion, education, industry, and military operations.3 2  I have al-
ready noted that many of our legislative institutions are not
"democratic" in composition. Is it possible that despite-or be-
cause of-our overt commitment to electoral democracy in one or
two of the three branches of government,3 3 there is a need in
such a society as ours to assign some fundamental policy decisions
" Alternatively, it may be asserted that the Supreme Court is not democratic, therefore
our country must not be democratic.
"1 Rostow, supra note 26, at 197.
32 Rostow refers to admirals and generals. Id. He did not take the further step of
noticing that all but a few holders of public and private office in this country are selected
by some procedure other than popular election. Bickel argues:
[Aidmirals and generals and the like are most often responsible to officials who
are themselves elected and through whom the line runs directly to a majority.
... [S]o long as there has been a meaningful delegation by the legislature to
administrators, which is kept within proper bounds, the essential majority
power is there ....
A. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 19-20. The concept of delegation thereby performs the task of
connecting meritocratic functionaries to a democratic electorate.
" Whether it is the President or Congress or both that is chosen via "democratic" pro-
cedures need not be inquired into on this occasion.
[Vol. 64:1
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to a council of elders and not the town meeting? Unless that ques-
tion is answered in the negative, there is simply no basis for as-
serting that a body operating through nondemocratic processes is
necessarily an inappropriate repository of legislative authority in a
polity that has democratic substantive objectives. 34
A second political argument against considering the Supreme
Court to be a legislature is that, as a means of developing legal
rules, case-by-case legal decisionmaking is superior to the process
of generalization involved in legislation. 35 Again, this proposition
is neither self-evident, demonstrable, nor even inherently plausi-
ble. As a matter of experience, it may be acknowledged that there
are many cases in which the Supreme Court was aided by having
a particular set of facts at hand. But surely it must be conceded
that there are also many cases in which the Court had serious
difficulty precisely because it was being asked to decide a question
of broad incidence in the context of a single and possibly aberrant
instance. 36  Indeed, the Court's sometimes employed practice of
waiting until a particular type of problem has been several times
considered in the courts below indicates the value of having a
cluster of fact variations before trying to formulate a rule for
cases of any given type.
As a matter of epistemology, the argument for case-by-case
decisionmaking seems plainly untenable. A case cannot be ration-
ally decided except by reference to some external framework of
generalization, whether of received law, life experience, ideology,
or whatever. Whether the framework should consist exclusively or
primarily of received law, or should incorporate more general
normative principles-and if so, which ones-is debatable. In-
deed, the choice of framework is usually the critical point in the
process of decision.3 7  Moreover, the argument for case-by-case
decisionmaking merely presumes that the event of an actual oc-
currence necessarily leads to a better formulated rule. Why does
not a suppositious case, or set of such cases, equally suffice? That,
after all, is the technique used by legislatures and in academic
34 Judge Learned Hand said that "it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians." L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). If Judge Hand is considered
to have been himself a member of the Guard, his opinion that its rule is irksome to the
governed is not based on first-hand experience.
" See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 66-67.
36 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
'7 See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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legal analysis. Indeed, in a strict sense, the Supreme Court de-
pends on suppositions of fact, for it takes its facts from another
source, the lower courts. Correlatively, the pronouncements of the
Supreme Court are legally significant, to everyone except the im-
mediate litigants, with regard to the supposed facts before the
Court and not those that may actually have transpired. And fi-
nally, if a court does want to apprehend the consequences of what
it is doing, the last thing it should do is focus solely on the facts
before it: They are a prologue.38
The argument for case-by-case decisionmaking by the Su-
preme Court thus defies the reality of the Court's institutional
position and takes incomplete account of the epistemology of legal
reasoning. What then is the point of the argument for case-by-
case decisionmaking? It may simply involve converting a proposi-
tion ostensibly concerned with the rationality of decisionmaking
into one actually concerned with the proper scope of judicial
lawmaking. The argument can be reconstructed as follows:
(1) The Court should decide in terms of the specific facts be-
fore it (ostensibly because that makes for greater rationality);
(2) If the Court decides in terms of the specific facts before
it, the legal categories it can construct will be relatively narrow,
because a category is narrow in proportion to the number of
specifications in which it is formulated ("rotten apples" is a nar-
rower category than "apples" and much narrower than "fruit").
(3) Thus, if the Court confines itself to "particular facts," it
can work only limited changes in the law in any given decision.
Moreover, if it is a norm or rule that the Court should decide
in terms of the specific facts before it, then two other conse-
quences further narrow the scope of the Court's rulemaking.
First, language in an opinion may subsequently be abandoned or
repudiated when, as the phrase goes, it was "unnecessary" to the
decision. This permits the Court to retract a proposition that on
further consideration appears unwise as originally formulated.
Second, parties seeking judicial legislation will be forced to limit
their contentions to situations whose specific characteristics are
very similar to ones already recognized in existing decisions. This
in turn will limit the scope of the legal questions in the Court's
intake, with a corresponding reduction in the scope of its output.
38 Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) with
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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I do not wish to be understood as saying that the Court
should make legal pronouncements in broader categorical terms
rather than narrower ones. I only say that the appropriate
breadth of its pronouncements about law is determined neither by
considerations of "rationality" nor by the "nature" of the judicial
process. It is determined instead by estimates of how broadly and
how rapidly the Court should perform its legislative function.
This, in turn, depends on estimates of how intelligently the Court
can gauge the practical and normative significance of what it is
doing in the matter at hand and what effect a decision will have
on related matters in the future. After all, opposite the Scylla of
undue breadth is the Charybdis of merely ad hoc decisions.3 9
Hence, if the point is that the Court's product is poor policy in
substance, it is tangential to argue that it may have been poor in
adjudicatory form.
A third political argument for the proposition that the Su-
preme Court should behave as though it were a court is that
otherwise political oppression or embarrassment might result.
This argument may involve contradictory political predictions. On
the one hand, it is foreseen that the Court, if accorded broad
legislative jurisdiction, would impose on the community require-
ments that would not have been imposed by a properly consti-
tuted legislature. What is feared, in short, is oligarchical rule.
Alexander Hamilton 4 and Alexander Bickel 4' both argued that
this possibility is remote, and our national history tends to support
them. The other political prediction has greater force. It is that
the Court, if accorded broad legislative jurisdiction, might
pronounce requirements that the community would reject and
thereupon also reject the authority of the Court, and with it the
authority of law itself. What is feared in this prediction is not
oligarchy, but anarchy and ensuing tyranny. Fear of such a conse-
quence is not baseless, as indicated by the reactions to the
decisions in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 42 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 43 and
Brown v. Board of Education.44 And contemplation of such a con-
sequence perhaps best explains the behavior of the Supreme
Court in reaching the decisions in Ex parte McCardle, 45 Korematsu
39 Wechsler, supra note 37, at 10-20.
40 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) 521, 523 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
41 A. BICKEL, supra note 1.
42 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
43 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
44 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See P. KURLAND, supra note I, at 23-32.
45 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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v. United States, 46 and Dennis v. United States,47 for example. Better
to compromise a legal principle, as Professor Bickel suggested,
than to jeopardize the mechanism of legal principle itself.48
The argument thus is a counsel of political prudence. There
is a paradoxical aspect to the position, because it implicitly
acknowledges that the Court should be concerned with what
people think about it-a proposition inconsistent with the idea
that the Court should be apolitical. Bypassing this conundrum,
however, the point of the argument is that if the Court behaved
as a proper court, it would thereby nurture respect and sustain its
authoritativeness in the public mind. Wrapped up in this argu-
ment, but not always made explicit, is a model of a "proper
court." The model is one of a traditional appellate court, under-
stood as a court that moves slowly, by degrees, and without a sub-
stantive strategy. Further down in this corpus of thought is
perhaps the idea that, if this technique is used, people will not
notice that the Court is legislating. What is clear, however, is that
the argument is not "neutral": It advocates conservatism both in
style and in substance on the ground that political self-destruction
will follow for the Court if it acts otherwise.
It may be conceded that the Court, so far as possible, should
exhibit a conservatism of style-that is, it should move by de-
grees, with forewarning through dicta, and with subtle rhetorical
art, as it goes about reshaping the law. Operating this way may
indeed fool some of the people all of the time, et cetera, and at any
rate keep the Court's technical critics in a more even-tempered
frame of mind. More importantly, movement by degrees allows
the community to absorb and adjust to new norms before they
become fully operative, just as legislation should have hearings be-
fore it is enacted.
But it is not equally clear that substantive conservatism is the
Court's best policy at all times and in all things. On this question,
opinion inclines in many directions. Of course it is true that, when
the Court changes the law and a large part of the country opposes
the change, then the Court risks its reputation. It is also true,
however, that when the Court refuses to change the law-moves
not at all but adheres to established legal principles-it may also
risk its reputation, as it did in the 1930's. More fundamentally,
46 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
47 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
48 But see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
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unwavering conservatism could cumulate in a less obvious but
more insidious result: Atrophy. It is clear, at least, that the accu-
racy of any prediction in this respect is itself a political question.
From the viewpoint of those who have to resolve the question-
the members of the Supreme Court-it is a matter of political
judgment.
The problem of the Court's political prudence therefore can-
not be that the Court should not employ a "prudential"
strategy-that it should not undertake to gauge the public accep-
tability of its alternatives in courses and styles of policymaking.
Instead, the point has to be that the Court's prudential strategy
should be well-informed in substance and skillfully executed. This
should also characterize the strategies of other political actors, the
President and Congress for instance, or cabinet members and
heads of agencies. The important question is therefore: What is
different about the Supreme Court?
What is different about the Court is not that it can neglect
the task of sustaining political support for itself. The difference is
that the Court must sustain political support without the political
mechanisms normally available to political agencies, such as the
power to spend or tax and to appoint or discharge. This
problem-building and maintaining political support-is simply
the reverse side of the problem of "accountability," which is what
all commentators on the Court are concerned about. If the prob-
lem is viewed this way, the political arguments concerning the role
of the Supreme Court go not so much to denying that it may
legislate as to articulating what kind of legislative body it is or
should be. That is a difficult question, but surely no less intelligi-
ble than comparable ones asked about the Presidency and Con-
gress. No doubt it can be answered only in terms that are inevita-
bly transient. But even transient answers are possible only if the
question is accepted as open to inquiry.
The political argument that the Supreme Court "is" a court
thus may be simply this: The Supreme Court should think of it-
self as a court because otherwise it will mishandle its legislative
functions. But once this argument is stated, it has to be restated as
follows: What are the proper limitations on a legislative body that
is thought of as a court?
This question is troublesome precisely because the Court is
also a court, Indeed, it is the Supreme Court. As such it has au-
thority not merely to pronounce the law but also to arbitrate fi-
nally how that law is to be construed and applied. And so if we
accept the fact that the Supreme Court is a legislative body, there
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
appears to be no agency to subject it to judicial review-to assure
its subordination to the law. If the essence of the rule of law is the
ubiquity of such subordination, then the Court's exercise of legis-
lative powers is itself a violation of the rule of law. This, in es-
sence, is the constitutional basis of the argument that the Court
"is" not a legislative body: It would be constitutionally intolerable
if it were.
There are two interconnected responses to this concern. The
first, advanced by Charles Black 49 and Herbert Wechsler,5 ° is that
Congress and the President subject the Court to review via the
power they possess to modify the Court's jurisdiction. While this
power has been rarely used, it has not infrequently been adverted
to when the Court has seemed to venture beyond its proper
bounds. Whether the power is strictly legislative, or is itself a form
of extraordinary appellate review wherein Congress judges the
Court according to the Constitution is a question that might be
worth examining. But however the power to revise the Court's
jurisdiction might be characterized, it is ever present and the
Court knows it.
The second response is that, within the foregoing limitation,
the ancient query, "Who judges the judges?," can be answered by
saying, "They judge themselves." All political institutions, in fact,
engage continuously in a process of self-examination and redirec-
tion. They try to bring to bear their faculties of reflection, teach-
ing, action, and forbearance in such a way as to inhibit and
counterbalance destructive and foolish tendencies within the in-
stitution itself. This is not regarded as a sufficient safeguard in
most political institutions, hence the system of checks and bal-
ances. But it is not impossible to imagine that an institution might
be sb constituted that within wide limits it could safely be made an
exception. Such an institution would be ultimately accountable in
the same way that an individual is ultimately accountable-not by
processes of external assessment but by the process of self-
judgment and self-control.
The creation of such a self-regulating institution is con-
cededly dangerous, even if "least dangerous."' 5 1  Since, by
hypothesis, such an institution would normally be beyond external
4' Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 846 (1975).
50 Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the
Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043, 1048 (1977).
51 See A. BICKEL, supra note 1.
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legal control, the key to securing its conformity to governing
norms-its institutional superego, so to speak-would have to be
found in its composition and procedure. The idea that effective
control of political power can be achieved by rules of composition
and procedure underlies the larger governmental structure of
which the Court is a part. What else do "checks and balances"
represent? The constitutional problem posed by the structure of
the Supreme Court as a legislature can thus be viewed as analo-
gous to the constitutional problem posed by the structure of the
government as a whole: If the institution is not subjected to regu-
lation by some external legal authority, 52 can it be subjected to
regulation by rules governing its composition? It is that kind of
rule, after all, that largely determines the functioning of legis-
latures.5 3  It will require another occasion to develop fully this
way of looking at the problem, but a preliminary view can be of-
fered.
III
THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's composition is fixed partly by rules but
largely by conventions. The resultant norms may be grouped as
follows.
1. Plural Membership
The Court is to be composed of at least two and probably
three members. This follows because the Constitution implicitly
refers to a multiple-member body 54 and a two-person body would
lack a rule of decision unless it accorded precedence to one of its
members or adopted the rule that a tie results in taking no action.
The plural composition of the Court is an important deter-
minant of its political characteristics. Conventional wisdom recog-
52 As of course the Supreme Court is. See Choper, supra note 27, at 848-55, and refer-
ences therein.
53 My reference is to the rules that govern how a legislator is nominated and elected
and what are his powers in office. The rules of this kind respectively governing the
Parliament of Great Britain and the United States Congress, for example, are very differ-
ent. The resultant differences in how these two legislative bodies operate can perhaps best
be appreciated by analyzing the details of the legislative process in each of them. Compare
R. FENNO, supra note 28 with COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE
COUNCIL, THE PREPARATION OF LEGISLATION, CMND. No. 6053 (1975).
5" See U.S. CONST. art III § I (referring to "Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts").
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nizes that a multimember entity is a poor instrument for executive
functions. Quite likely this is because a single mind has much
lower transaction costs in receiving and transmitting information,
has no internal conflicts over status and privilege that can con-
found its programs, and has a unified concept of its constituencies
and the array of their interests. There is probably more to it than
this. But whatever the reasons that make a plural entity a poor
executive instrument, they also mean that such an entity has spe-
cial properties as an author of policy.
A group requires some minimum of open communication to
reach a decision, thus limiting the possibilities for surprise and
deception in formulating policy. It is also necessary that its mem-
bers adhere to a more or less coherent set of rules concerning
participation and assent within the group and a more or less
homogenous concept of constituency interests, lest the group be
immobilized by its cross-purposes. The effect of these internal
constraints is to require a large common denominator in the pol-
icy alternatives that the group can seriously consider. This large
common denominator in policy orientation, by the same token,
assures wider acceptability of policy product.
The significance of these attributes of plural membership in-
creases geometrically as the size of the group increases, at least as
long as its size does not exceed that of a "small group." In the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress declared that the Supreme Court
would consist of at least six members (a quorum being four),5 5 so
that any decision required three votes and a conclusive decision
required four. The number subsequently was increased, reaching
nine in 1837, where it has since remained except for a brief
period during and after the Civil War.5' The "court packing"
fight of 1937 appears to have established that the size of the
Court will continue at nine as long as the Republic survives.
Perhaps that is the largest "small group" that can function over
time without internal differentiation or specialization. Hence, nine
may be an optimal size if the aim is an entity that can function
only with continuing internal consensus as to its office.
2. Life Service in Office
Subject to the requirement of "good behaviour," the Constitu-
tion entitles the members of the Supreme Court to serve for life.
" Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73.
56 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 38.
" See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 167-71 (9th ed. 1975).
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The Constitution does not require a person upon becoming a Jus-
tice to take a vow that he or she will never return to some other
vocation. Indeed, the first appointees to the Supreme Court did
not regard themselves as thus bound and there have been occa-
sional modern exceptions, notably Justice Hughes's entry into
presidential politics, Justice Byrnes's recruitment to wartime serv-
ice, Justice Jackson's temporary assignment as prosecutor at
Nuremberg, and Justice Goldberg's translation to the United Na-
tions. All but the last of these deviations evoked substantial criti-
cism, however, as did Chief Justice Warren's undertaking respon-
sibility for the investigation of the Kennedy assassination. 58  It
may be stretching things to say that a rule has been established,
yet it does seem fair to say that the norm, though perhaps still
emergent, has become that membership on the Supreme Court is
the last stage of a career. This goes rather beyond the Constitu-
tion's stipulation that a Justice may not be removed except by im-
peachment.59
The rule of life service not only protects incumbents against
ouster from office but also protects the office against exploitation
by incumbents. Hence, except for the requirement of "good be-
haviour," service on the Supreme Court must be undertaken
without regard to reward or penalty other than the voice of criti-
cism. An office so defined is both weaker and stronger than other
political offices. It is weaker because its incumbent has nothing to
give-no patronage to confer, no preferments to grant. Unlike
other political officials, a Justice has also lost the ability to reduce
uncertainty about the future by making promises concerning it;
having already made a promise that fully commits his own future,
he has none left for exchange. He is a lame duck from the mo-
ment he is sworn in. That leaves him bereft of the kind of politi-
cal capital that most politicians continually struggle to protect.
What a life incumbent has gained, of course, is immunity
from the blandishments of the regular political marketplace. This
adds to the moral force of a Justice's decisions by giving credence
" See Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A.J. 919 (1969); Frank,
Conflict of Interest and U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 18 AM. J. CoMp. L. 744 (1970); McKay,
The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1970). Cf. ABA CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 5G (judge should not accept extrajudicial political appoint-
ment). But cf. Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup. CT. REV.
123 ("obligation" of extrajudicial activities for early Supreme Court Justices).
59 See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973); Ervin, Separa-
tion of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1970); Kurland, The
Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 665
(1969).
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-to the supposition that there was nothing in them for him. It is a
personal aspect of the notion that the Court should be impartial,
and in an impure political world, that can be a considerable re-
source.
Perhaps it should be added that another kind of pre-
occupation with the future can intrude itself into the mind of a
servant for life. This is an inappropriate concern for the verdict
of history. History is inevitably narcissistic and probably is inher-
ently biased in favor of conspicuous performance. Neither
characteristic befits lions under the throne. To have policymaking
power of which one cannot (as a practical matter) be divested is
worrisome enough to others; to exercise it through egocentric in-
dulgence could degenerate into official insolence or something
worse. This suggests that appointments to the Court should be
made from among persons whose other ambitions in life appear
already to have been fulfilled, like the appointed members of the
House of Lords. Perhaps we are now tending in that direction.
3. Proficiency in Law and Practical Affairs
It has never been a legal requirement that Supreme Court
Justices be lawyers, but it is an unbroken convention. Given the
Court's policymaking process, it is a practical necessity that a Jus-
tice be a lawyer. Much of the Court's business actually requires
application of existing substantive law and all of it involves a good
deal of procedural law. Without technical knowledge of these sub-
jects, a Justice would have difficulty identifying precisely what pol-
icy questions are involved in the cases before him and whether
and how their resolution could be procedurally advanced or post-
poned. The confirmation proceedings on Harold Carswell estab-
lished that professional competence as well as legal training is a
component of fitness for appointment to the Court.60  That and
the reestablishment of the American Bar Association peer review
procedure 61 may even have settled the point that a modicum of
legal proficiency is a necessary if not sufficient qualification for
the office.
What is also required is substantial experience in roles of high
responsibility, if sometimes low visibility, in managing affairs of
power. 62 Again, this is not a rule of law but a result of practical
60 See R. HARRIS, DECISION (1971).
61 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
6 See generally Kurland, The Appointment and Disappointment of Supreme Court Justices,
1972 LAW & Soc. ORD. 183, 183-214.
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necessity. On the one hand, a political celebrity is an unlikely can-
didate for the Supreme Court precisely because he is too "politi-
cal." On the other hand, a potential appointee does not get on the
"short list" for the Supreme Court unless he is able to withstand
the scrutiny of the Attorney General and the Senate Judiciary
Committee, to say nothing of the President. To pass this test, he
must have suitably impressed them, or someone who can provide
a convincing voucher. Specifically, he must have proven himself to
have discernment in matters of complexity, steadiness in matters
of difficulty, and coolness in matters of controversy. These qual-
ities are looked for because they are recognized, by a discriminat-
ing group of electors, as being essential in the Supreme Court
office.
There are many ways to gain a reputation for having these
qualities, but few that are more intensive than the practice of law
or politics, or both. And because reputation is not built overnight,
extended experience in such a practice is in effect obligatory. It is
at any rate a fact that virtually all Supreme Court Justices in the
last century have been people trained in the law who have spent
their adult lives in law practice, politics, or government, or some
combination of these activities. To those of us in the legal profes-
sion this may not appear very significant, for we may be inclined
to suppose that all rational people think like lawyers. But it is
surely plausible that there is a distinctive outlook associated with
having spent one's life dealing with the opportunities and perils
inherent in matters of power. And surely it is not implausible that
people who have had legal training are different from other
people in the way they think, on account of self-selection if not
the training itself.
Thus, there is reason to suppose that the required qualifica-
tions of legal training and experience in practical affairs yield a
membership on the Court having a distinctive outlook compared,
say, with presidential candidates or leaders of business and labor,
not to speak of the average citizen. Available information does not
permit precise identification of what these differences are. Never-
theless, it is a fair conjecture that lawyers are usually predisposed
to attach special significance, for example, to obligation as com-
pared to opportunity, to historical precedent as compared to pres-
ent intuition, and to formal similarities as compared to "real"
uniquenesses. At the same time, it is a fair conjecture that their
experience as counsellors in practical affairs leads lawyers to be
particularly aware that in policymaking there are conflicting aims,
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multiple levels of discourse, discrepancies between professed and
actual goals, and shortfalls in the realization of nearly every pur-
pose. This body of practical knowledge can be of inestimable use
in formulating policy.
If the foregoing is a reasonably faithful description of a prac-
ticed "legal mind," and if it is an established convention that Su-
preme Court appointees must have such qualities, then the effect
is that the Court's composition is mostly of intellectual conserva-
tives. This may be a startling thesis, given the ongoing national
debate on whether the Court's activism has been good or bad. But
we should recall Disraeli's dictum that conservative men do not
always deem it prudent to pursue conservative measures. Further,
John Marshall's example should remind us that at times a radical
policy is necessary in the preservative tendency that is the essence
of conservatism. For instance, who will say that the Supreme
Court's deciding Brown v. Board of Education as and when it did
was not better for the country than having the desegregation issue
fought out in the Senate as, say, a rider to the Tonkin Gulf Res-
olution?
4. Constituency
The Supreme Court has no electoral constituency. Indeed, its
lack of such a constituency is taken as a reason why the Supreme
Court should not be considered a legislature-on the premise, re-
ferred to earlier, that a legislative body is legitimate in a democ-
racy only if it is directly or indirectly elective. Yet if the latter
premise is abandoned, it uncovers the question whether a non-
elective body can be said to have a constituency.
There is a sense in which every entity exercising political au-
thority has a constituency: The constituency is the group or coali-
tion of groups that is willing to exert itself to see that the entity's
political authority is maintained. Hence, the fact that the authority
of the Supreme Court enjoys continued recognition is evidence
that the Court must have a constituency. But that proposition is
not very illuminating, for it holds true as well for the Presidency,
the Congress, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jer-
sey. Rather, the matter for inquiry is whether there is an interest
or set of interests that particularly sustains the Court, that acts as
the Court's special protector, and that generates continued sup-
port for the Court's role as a policymaker. This inquiry essentially
parallels that concerning the more obvious representative relation-
ship between a Congressman and his district or between a Senator
[Vol. 64:1
1978] THE SUPREME COURT AS A LEGISLATURE 23
and his stateY.3 That is, does the Supreme Court have a "district"
and, if so, where or what is it?
In approaching this question, the rules and conventions gov-
erning the relationship between the Supreme Court and its constit-
uency may be considered in two aspects: norms that disconnect the
Court from those sources of influence having more or less direct
ties to the voting electorate at large, and norms that connect the
Court to particular political interests. Regarding disconnection, a
Justice upon assuming office is supposed to have cut any former
ties to the constituencies that sustain the Executive and the Legis-
lature. It is also now generally held that a Justice should not serve
on policymaking bodies other than the Supreme Court, such as
advisory commissions, except those involving judicial procedure
and administration.6 4 Public reproval of Abe Fortas' acting as in-
formal adviser to President Johnson has apparently established
that such a confidential advisory role is equally impermissible be-
cause it involves a Justice in policy matters outside the Court's
domain. Criticism of Chief Justice Burger's alleged confidential
involvement in congressional deliberations has confirmed the
point. Further, it has long been settled that no member of the
Court should be involved with a political party. Hence, "direct"
involvement with the conventionally defined political process is
strictly proscribed.
Further isolation of Justices from electoral politics results
from the rules governing tenure on the Court. Since the Justices
do not run for reelection, they have no practical need to stay in
touch with the political organizations. (In this respect, their situa-
tion is quite different from judges whose office is elective.)
Moreover, the constitutional provisions governing appointments
to the Court, resulting in unpredictability of terms and vacancies,
put distance between the Court and the centers of elected political
power. Because vacancies cannot be accurately forecast, appoint-
ments cannot be lined up. Hence, the mutual expectations be-
tween appointing authority and prospective appointee that are in-
volved in a firmly promised appointment do not have opportunity
to develop. For the same reason, a President cannot count on an
opportunity to reconstitute the Court even if he thinks he has a
popular mandate to do so. Then again, once an appointment is
made, the appointee retains his position of authority long past the
63 See D. MAYHEW, supra note 27.
64 See note 58 supra.
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dissolution of the political matrix out of which his appointment
arose. The political events expressed in a Supreme Court ap-
pointment are thus rapidly obsolescent and the Justices themselves
soon become anachronisms with respect to partisan political
alignments.
These norms isolating the Court from the electoral constitu-
encies are manifest and well noted. 65 Indeed, they are often ad-
vanced as reasons why the Court should not be considered a legis-
lative body-because its members are out of touch. But these
rules of isolation can equally be considered as simply appropriate
for a peculiar legislative chamber. At any rate, the rigorous isola-
tion required by these norms takes on special significance in con-
sidering the other aspect of the constituency issue: norms that
connect the Court to particular political interests.
The point is simply this: Given the very strong norms isolat-
ing the Court from constituencies functioning through the elec-
toral process, a constituency functioning through some non-
electoral process could sustain the Court even if the connections
between them were relatively weak and diffuse. And this leads to
a further point-that in searching for the Supreme Court's con-
stituency we should not expect a tidily defined group. Indeed,
because there is no such group, the conclusion often drawn is that
the Court has no constituency, and hence that it represents
everyone or no one. But surely that is an empty and unsatisfying
conclusion. If the Court has a general constituency and not a spe-
cial one, what has been all the controversy over the Court's politi-
cal role?
Another analysis concludes that the Court is the protector of
minorities. This comes closer, it would seem, but is an interpreta-
tion that still leaves much to be desired. For one thing, it may be
simply tautological-saying only that an interest seeks refuge in
the Court when it cannot get protection from the majoritarian
branches. For another, the minority-protection thesis provides no
clue as to which minorities the Court will protect, or why. The
thesis also takes no account of the circumstance that the Court has
not, in fact, provided legal protection for any particular minority
over a long period of time; rather it has aided a variety of
minorities ranging from federalists to business entrepreneurs to
Blacks. It also takes no account of the important role of the Court
in resolving conflicts of authority between the executive and legis-
65 See Kurland, supra note 62, at 214-18.
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lative branches " and, especially in times past, between the federal
government and the states.6 7
It is difficult to relate the Court's manifest political roles to
any definite economic, social, or geographical constituency, as that
term is ordinarily understood. Yet trying to identify the Court's
political constituency is a way of trying to define its distinctive
characteristics as a policymaking body. It may therefore be useful
to approach the problem inductively, by identifying the interest
groups to which the Court is said to be particularly sensitive or
which are specially interested in its product.
As one directs thought along this line, the following groups
warrant inclusion in such a category: the lower courts, federal and
state; the academic community (especially in law but also in such
subjects as political science); the intelligentsia media and the
media intelligentsia, meaning the New York Times, et cetera, and the
syndicated political columnists and broadcast commentators; the
organized bar, particularly the American Bar Association;
Washington, D.C., lawyers and lobbyists; that part of the practic-
ing bar outside Washington that specializes in federal matters;
agency administrators and general counsel at the federal level and
their counterparts at the state and local levels; leaders of minority
interest groups currently embroiled in judicial lawmaking en-
deavors; and elective officeholders at all but the lowest levels of
government.
In numbers this is not much of a support group but in politi-
cal potency it is substantial. What these groups have in common is
that they consist of policymakers or people trying to influence or
analyze policymakers. They are interested in the Court for the
same reason they are interested in the Presidency and Con-
gress-because these institutions ultimately determine the direc-
tions in which public policy will develop. It seems evident that the
Court is correlatively concerned with these groups, although this
is not openly acknowledged. At the most elementary level, how-
ever, these groups to an important degree determine what the
Court is. That is, they proffer questions to the Court and provide
it with the immediate and background information that will in-
form its decisions. 8 They interpret the Court's product for the
public and thus determine how the decisions are understood and
" See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
67 See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
6R See generally Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow or
Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187 (1975).
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whether they will be given much effect.69 They decide who can
be appointed to the Court. They are also judges of the Justices'
performance individually and collectively, because they are the
writers of contemporary history and the mentors of the historians
of the future.
Thinking of these groups as the Court's immediate constitu-
ency is complicated by the fact that they have no apparent
common identity. Obviously they comprise no geographical constit-
uency, although in fact they are almost exclusively urban and
predominantly coastal. They have no common substantive in-
terests except such as accompany membership in the economic
upper-middle class. But they have a common interest in their own
function in the political system. They are the brokers of power,
including ideological power, in a social order characterized by a
mixed economy, ethnic and religious diversity, and a profusion of
political centers. In short, they share a vested interest in the
pluralistic political process itself.
I do not suggest that this group is the Court's sole constitu-
ency. The suggestion is merely that this is the Court's immediate
constituency. Its members are the people most intensively in-
volved in arguing with the Court about its policy options and de-
cisions and at the same time sustaining it in political argument
with the rest of the country. °
The common characteristics of this group also serve to indi-
cate the political interest that the Court specially protects. The
interest may be defined as that of perpetuating an open political
process. It can be thought of as a special interest like business or
labor or women or religious sects. Of course, to suggest that those
intensely and professionally concerned with preserving an open
political process be thought of as a special interest is also to
suggest that the concern for perpetuating an open political pro-
cess is not universally shared.
That point may be conceded. Indeed, it may be affirmed
that, as a matter of fact, most of the people most of the time do
not have a binding commitment to the open political process. I
would surmise that at any given time an open political process is
preferred only by a transient minority. All political parties, like all
businesses, strive for monopoly; all interest groups try to drown
out their opponents and very likely would seek to stifle them if
69 See, e.g., K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS (1971).
70 Compare P. KURLAND, supra note 1 with Kurland, supra note 59.
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not legally restrained; all branches and agencies of government
seek ascendancy when confronted by opposition; and summary
justice for deviants is probably favored by a clear majority.
The impulses animating these tendencies are kept under con-
trol through the law of free speech, due process, equal protection,
and separation of powers. But general political support for giving
effect to this body of law is often lacking. The definition of these
constitutional precepts is the special responsibility of the Supreme
Court. Its enforcement efforts are politically sustained chiefly by
the interest group previously described. That constituency acts for
its own special interests in providing such support, but in doing so
it serves as a surrogate for a much larger but indeterminate con-
stituency. That larger constituency includes everyone who might
be a beneficiary of the open political process in the future.

